Providing much quantitative data to support findings, these sociologists of religion spice up the read with stories and statements from the millions saying “goodbye” to religion in America. The religiously unaffiliated number stands at one-third of the US population and is growing. With previous publications on secularization and religion in North America, Cragun at the University of Tampa and Smith at Western Michigan University are well qualified to write this book.

The findings are based on nationally representative data and include over 100 in-depth interviews. Almost every finding is qualified by acknowledging complications in drawing simple conclusions. The authors are also cautious about predictions. That said, they provide interesting findings, sometimes contradicting prevailing opinions.

The major finding is that religious exiters increasingly match those of the population at large (i.e., age, race, education, class, gender), contrary to the view that exiters are mostly young, white, educated, well-to-do men, which may have been more the case 50 years ago. Three main pathways to religious exiting are identified. On a continuum, they are religious indifference, religious-secular liminality (finding value in religion for society, but not for themselves), and secular activism (actively criticizing religion and/or promoting secular beliefs).

Other findings include: some people leaving religion return later in life, but that is an exception to the rule; social and political progressives are more likely to exit; very few nonreligious people are in the Republican Party, due in part to the alignment of the Party with conservativism; devout people leave religion, although exiting is primarily by people nominally involved; transmitting religion from parents to children is increasingly hard, especially in the era of internet access and social media; and nonreligious people are no more likely than the religious to violate universally accepted moral codes.

One challenge for religion is finding balance between modernizing and remaining supportive of conservative members. “The religions that seem to be surviving in the face of rapid secularization are those that do slowly change their morals (and concomitant doctrines), but they do so well after those values have changed in society, generally.” (p. 84)

Both push and pull factors are at work in saying goodbye to religion. Factors pushing people out include what are considered by exiters as unacceptable moral teachings, hard-to-defend doctrines, objectionable political statements, and—a big one—perceived hypocrisy on the part of family, friends, and leaders in the religious community. Pull factors include personal autonomy, alignment with a modern and scientific worldview, and having better things to do than “go to church.” Unaware of the data about push and pull factors, religious leaders often explain the exodus from religion by solely blaming the exiters.

Most people leaving religion find new interests, without changing their lives in any appreciable way. Others replace religious community with different support groups. Some exiters join organizations that actively critique religion and promote secularism. All categories of exiters, for the most part, find meaning, develop relationships, value family (although they will have less kids), and continue giving to charities.

One widely disseminated claim is that religion contributes positively to people’s health. Cragun and Smith argue yes it does, but not directly. Religious behavior improves health when it discourages unhealthy behaviors like smoking, abusing alcohol, and ingesting illicit drugs. Social support contributes to health. So, religion indirectly contributes to health by encouraging healthy behaviors and a supportive social network, factors that usually continue in the lives of exiters.

A creative, helpful metaphor used by the authors is that of a giant pool of water surrounded by different size cliffs. The pool of water represents secularity/life without religion; the cliffs represent religious traditions, with the lowest cliffs being the lowest-cost religions. For those standing on the lowest cliffs (e.g., Episcopalians) or cliffs almost at level with the water (e.g., Unitarian Universalists), the “jump” into the pool of secularism is easy, with little changing in one’s life. As more friends jump in, the water level rises, making the plunge even easier. The highest cliffs are the high-cost traditions (e.g., Amish, Pentecostalism), requiring much courage to jump. Other cliffs are mid-range (e.g., Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant denominations), with moderate effort required to enter the secular waters.

My faults with the book are minimal. The authors could have given more attention to the fundamentalist movement, which, while originating in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, continued to play an important role in American culture and politics well into the period covered by this book, i.e., the last 50 years. Looking into the future, the impact of radical human enhancement technology, signaled by the rapid advancement in artificial intelligence in the last three years, will impact everything, including religion. In future publications, the authors should pay close attention to these technical developments, and more could have been said about them in this book.

There is great value here for students of American culture, religious leaders wanting to be relevant and effective, and public policy experts.